Peacekeeping-Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Staff Handbook (PKISR HB)

Second Edition

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DEPARTMENT OF PEACE OPERATIONS

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Foreword

I am very pleased to introduce the second edition of the UN Peacekeeping-Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (PKISR) Staff Handbook. The refinement of this handbook represents the ongoing progress being achieved in enhancing our acquisition of information to support the field of peacekeeping-intelligence, which itself is an essential pillar of all peacekeeping missions globally.

Neither the initial document nor this second edition could have been developed without the support of the Member States and peacekeeping missions, whose contribution has ensured that this remains a relevant, effective, and useful handbook.

The PKISR Staff Handbook is a living document and complements both the Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence Handbook (2025) and the PKISR UN Military Unit Manual (2022). We will continue to refine both handbooks and the manual to ensure they remain relevant to the developing challenges facing peacekeeping operations.

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Contents

INTRODUCTION

PKISR – The Basics

The aim of this Handbook is to support staff deployed in Peacekeeping-Intelligence (PKI) roles in UN peacekeeping operations to manage the Peacekeeping-Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (PKISR) assets available within the Mission. This Handbook should be read in conjunction with the DPO Peacekeeping-Intelligence Policy and the Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence (MPKI) Handbook.

The term PKISR has two basic meanings. It is used as a term to describe the various assets used to acquire PKI, such as ground patrols, manned aircraft, Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)[1], etc., and it is also the term used to refer to the process of managing that acquisition.

The crucial point to note is that PKISR represents the means to achieve the Acquisition step in the UN MPKI and PKI Cycles.

Every Mission will be unique in terms of its PKISR assets and the specific structure of its decision-making processes. This Handbook presents a baseline guide as to how PKISR can be conducted; Missions can adapt the details of processes to fit their operating model providing the DPO Policies referenced throughout are respected.

Figure 1: UN Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence Cycle

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[1] It should be noted that the gender-neutral term "Uncrewed" is sometimes used unofficially in place of "Unmanned". However, in order to align with extant International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) terminology and regulations, the term "Unmanned" remains the official form for the time being.

The UN MPKI Cycle is described in the MPKI Handbook and (as of that publication's Second Edition) reflects the adoption of the 5-step cycle to align with PKI publications. The PKISR Staff Handbook supports UN personnel in acquiring the PKI necessary to enhance situational awareness and the safety and security of UN personnel, and to inform operations and activities related to the protection of civilians. The management of PKISR is a major element of the MPKI cycle, which exists to support the UN Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). MPKI support to the MDMP is described in Chapter 7 of the MPKI Handbook. However, PKISR outputs also feed into the Mission-level decision-making processes and inform leadership decisions at all levels as well, not only those within the Force.

Figure 2: Flow of the MDMP

This Handbook explains the PKISR-related roles of the various elements within UN peacekeeping operations, to include Mission leadership, those actively working within PKI, anyone who might need to request support from PKI entities, and those involved in generating PKISR capabilities for UN peacekeeping operations.

It is important to note that PKI (and therefore PKISR) differs from national intelligence methodologies, and this Handbook is designed to allow UN staff to bridge the gap between the two. Furthermore, each Mission will function slightly differently and therefore this Handbook is intended to be a guideline for principles and procedures, which may be altered slightly to suit specific Mission needs.

CHAPTER ONE

1. PKISR: Policy and Guidance

1.1. Purpose and Scope

1.1.1.   Due to the inherently close nature of MPKI and PKISR there are many principles that are common to both. The fundamental purpose of MPKI in UN peacekeeping operations is to enhance situational awareness, assist the safety and security of UN personnel, and to inform operations and activities related to the Protection of Civilians (PoC) tasks of the Security Council mandates. PKISR contributes to this situational awareness and supports UN decision-making. The following Mission-wide tasks therefore apply to PKISR as well as to MPKI and PKI as a whole:

   a. Provide situational understanding and predictive PKI products to better enable military peacekeeping planning and decision-making. Commanders who have access to good PKI are better able to take appropriate actions.

   b. Provide early warning of threats to the security of UN personnel, both uniformed and civilian.

   c. Provide early warning of threats to the local population in support of PoC. Linked to this is early warning of any planned destruction of critical infrastructure or essential natural resources.

   d. Enhance the Mission leadership's understanding of shifts in the strategic and operational landscape through the early identification of relevant trends and threats. This will facilitate the identification of risks and opportunities for the protection of UN personnel and civilians within the scope of the mandate.

1.1.2.   The distinction between PKISR and MPKI is that PKISR is the mechanism by which the bulk of the information needed to conduct analysis will be acquired. It is important to note that the tasking of PKISR assets is not the sole domain of the military element of the Mission, though in many Missions the expertise to manage the PKISR process will likely be found within the military element.

Although most PKISR assets will likely be managed by military elements, it is crucial that PKISR is understood as an activity conducted for the benefit of the Mission as a whole.

1.1.3.   The Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) and the UN Police (UNPOL) within the Mission may (and should be encouraged to) request support through the U2 for PKISR assets to acquire information on their behalf. Furthermore, the process within the Mission should be established such that all Mission civilian and uniformed components can request information that may be tasked for acquisition by PKISR assets. It should be noted that it is very important that the MPKI entity responsible for managing PKISR operates a clear prioritisation process so that any requests

can be validated and prioritised.[2] There will never be enough PKISR assets within a Mission to satisfy all the requirements levied against them and therefore prioritisation is an essential aspect in successfully managing PKISR.

1.1.4.   This Handbook focuses on the fundamental principles and processes of PKISR within UN peacekeeping missions. Some Missions have so few PKISR assets that there is no dedicated element within the PKI structure to manage them, whereas other Missions may have an entire section dedicated to this purpose. The scope of this Handbook is to provide guidance for all Missions regarding the manner in which PKISR should be managed to make the most of what is always a finite resource.

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[2] Chapter 3 will focus on prioritisation.

CHAPTER TWO

2. PKISR Fundamentals

2.1. PKISR Process

2.1.1. The PKISR process is designed to answer PKI questions. It is important to set up the process within the Mission to allow anyone to ask a question such that the U2[3] can attempt to answer it using the PKISR resources available to the Mission. The core of tasking for PKISR assets should be the Mission Information Acquisition Plan (IAP). However, Requests for Information (RFIs) should also be addressed via PKISR acquisition if appropriate and once the RFI is prioritised against other tasking.

2.1.2. The management of PKISR is a complex process and this handbook is intended to simplify it as far as possible to allow Missions to establish or refine existing processes to optimise resources.

> **The effective management of PKISR requires good judgement in order to make difficult decisions based on established priorities. Underpinning this must be a clear understanding amongst all those involved in the PKISR process of the Mission's mandate and key operational priorities.**

2.1.3. Peacekeeping-intelligence activities must be conducted with full respect for human rights, including in particular the rights to privacy, freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly, and with particular care not to expose any sources or potential sources of information to harm. Details of the PKI process must not be divulged to non-Mission actors that maintain sensitive relations with partners.

2.2. Definitions

2.2.1. **Commander's Critical Information Requirement (CCIR).** A CCIR can be anything that leadership (for the military component this will be the Force Commander) determines to be information that is required to allow them to make timely and effective decisions; these are not necessarily limited to PKI-related issues. For the purpose of conducting PKISR activities the U2 will obviously focus on those CCIRs that relate to PKI. It should be noted that in many cases the U2 will need to define the CCIRs on behalf of the leadership and gain endorsement of them before progressing.

2.2.2. **Priority Peacekeeping-Intelligence Requirement (PIR).** The PIRs should be drawn primarily from the CCIRs but can also be derived from strategic guidance from leadership. The Mission will have PIRs with which the Force PIRs should be coherent; the Mission Peacekeeping-Intelligence Coordination Mechanism (MICM), if established in the Mission, is the appropriate forum for this to be achieved. Again, the U2 will need to define the Force PIRs on behalf of the Force and Mission leadership and they should be regularly reviewed to ensure that they are still relevant. The PIRs form the basis of most acquisition tasks and therefore time must be invested

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[3] The U2 sits at the Force level, G2 at the Sector level, and S2 at the Battalion level.

in ensuring that they are well thought out and truly represent the needs of the Force and wider Mission. The successful management of PKISR relies heavily on the ability to prioritise acquisition and therefore the PIRs must reflect the Force's priorities (which in turn must be coherent with those of the Mission as a whole) to ensure appropriate coordination. See paragraph 3.2 for detail.

2.2.3. **Specific Peacekeeping-Intelligence Requirement (SIR).** Each PIR is in turn broken down into several SIRs which relate back to the PIR. The purpose of breaking them down is to allow the U2 to get to the point where the acquisition units can start to answer the PIRs. The SIRs are best structured thematically to support this process. The importance of prioritising the SIRs at this stage cannot be overstated, since this will be essential in supporting the effective management of acquisition assets. See paragraph 3.2 for detail.

2.2.4. **Essential Elements of Information (EEI).** The EEI is the final step in the refinement of a PIR and are effectively the individual questions that will be assigned to the acquisition assets. The EEIs relate to the SIR, which in turn relate to the PIR. Once again, clarity is important, as is prioritisation to support effective PKISR management. There are no set rules on how many EEIs relate to an SIR or in turn how many SIRs relate to the PIR. Each Mission will have different issues affecting the ability to deliver against the mandate and therefore there is no right or wrong answer. See paragraph 3.2 for detail.

2.2.5. **Request For Information (RFI).** The RFI process allows any individual or entity in the Mission to ask a question that may be able to be answered by the PKISR capabilities under the Mission's command and control. This should not be limited to the military side of the Mission; a well-established process should allow for all Mission civilian and uniformed components to submit an RFI, which can be prioritised against other tasks to allow for the effective use of PKISR assets.

2.2.6. **Indicators and Warnings (I&W).** An indicator is an observable behaviour or event that points towards a particular outcome, or that confirms or denies a relevant actor's course of action. Generally, the U2 should ensure that indicators are linked to a Named Area of Interest (NAI), where such behaviours and events can be observed. A warning is a more defined alert, generally derived from various indicators and often relating to an imminent threat.

2.2.7. **Named Area of Interest (NAI).** NAIs are geographical areas or points where required information is expected to be observed or acquired. For example, following reporting of a potential Improvised Explosive Device (IED) emplacement, monitoring the road in question could verify the reporting as the local population will be unlikely to use the road if they know that an IED has been placed to target peacekeepers. Equally, an NAI may be placed over a location used by an illegal armed group when they are preparing to conduct attacks, so that the area can be monitored for indications of upcoming hostile activities. The continuous monitoring of indicators can help to prevent operational or tactical surprise. For more detailed understanding of NAIs, refer to the MPKI Handbook.

2.2.8. **Information or Peacekeeping-Intelligence Requirement (IR).** In the context of PKISR, an IR is the basis for the tasking of an acquisition unit.[4] The IR may originate from within or without the PKI system but once it has been validated and incorporated into the PKISR process the manner of its generation becomes unimportant until the acquisition is complete and the results

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[4] Note that on the civilian side of the Mission, the term IR may be used to cover all requirements and the terms detailed here may not be used or may be used in a different context. It is important for the U2 to clarify this when tasking is received from outside of the military environment to avoid confusion.

are disseminated to the originator of the IR. All IRs will be prioritised to allow for the most effective tasking of acquisition units.

2.2.9.   **Information Acquisition Plan (IAP).** The IAP is where the PIRs, SIRs and EEIs are listed and lays out what type of acquisition (by PKI discipline) could answer the EEIs and when the information is required by. The IAP is a living document and should be formally reviewed at regular intervals (ideally quarterly) to provide a balance between, on the one hand, avoiding constant changes and allowing the process time to provide answers, and on the other hand ensuring that the IAP remains current and relevant. It should be routine that there are several IAPs within the Mission at Mission, Force, Sector and Battalion level; the Mission IAP is the highest and all others should be coherent with it.

2.2.10. **Information Acquisition List (IAL).** The IAL is the daily list of all the IRs that are planned to receive acquisition effort on a given day. The IAL is a combination of the refined IRs which have been prioritised accordingly and provides a list of which IRs are tasked against which PKISR assets. The prioritisation aspect of the process is very important as this allows the staff tasking PKISR assets via the IAL to easily understand what information should be acquired first.

2.2.11. **Pre-planned tasking.** The pre-planned PKISR tasks are those in the IAL scheduled for acquisition the following day.

2.2.12. **Dynamic tasking.** Dynamic tasking is required when a high priority incident occurs and the PKISR assets that were working on the IAL must be re-tasked. In this case, the accurate prioritisation of IRs is essential to understand the impact of the dynamic tasking. Those involved in the planning and execution of the IAL must quickly determine if the PKISR asset that had previously been tasked against the IAL was acquiring high priority requirements and if another asset can be re-tasked to cover the highest priority IRs. In smaller Missions dynamic tasking may inevitably result in some or all of the IAL not being completed that day, in which case the following day's IAL will need to be amended to account for the disruption caused by the dynamic tasking.

2.3.   PKISR Command and Control

2.3.1.   It is important for every Mission to have a clear understanding of PKISR command and control and how the tasking of PKISR capabilities occurs at the different organisational levels. In some Missions there will be PKISR assets held at every level – Force, sector and battalion – and anyone in the Mission should be able to benefit from information acquired by any asset. The key is to implement a system that allows this to occur as simply as possible for the individual making the request. The requester should not be exposed to the complexity behind how their question is answered. Effective command and control ensures this.

2.3.2.   The most effective way to manage PKISR assets is to execute a centralised command and decentralised control structure. In practice this means that whilst the Director/Chief of Mission Support (D/CMS) is ultimately accountable for the effective utilisation of UN commercial or military PKISR assets,[5] the process of assigning appropriate tasking to those assets should be conducted at a lower level, typically being managed by Chief PKISR on behalf of the U2 in cases where the assets are military ones or allocated to the Force. Again, it is critical to remember that PKISR assets are there to support the Mission level and even in cases where the Force has the daily responsibility for managing and coordinating tasking, the IRs that the assets are assigned to must reflect the priorities of the Mission IAP as a whole.

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[5] Authority, Command and Control in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Policy, 25 October 2019

2.3.3.   In the case of PKISR, the Force should command the assets within the Mission on behalf of the D/CMS and they should be controlled at the appropriate level, depending on the task. For example, a Class III UAS should be controlled at the Force level, assigned against high level IRs. However, there may be times when it is appropriate to delegate control of the asset for a defined period of time to support sector level activity or an operation. Smaller, more tactical PKISR units should be commanded and controlled at a lower level (sector or battalion) but still be available for tasking by entities above and below the controlling organisation.

2.3.4.   Implicit in command and control is the need to determine whether the task assigned to an acquisition unit is complete. The U2 (or G2/S2 if control is delegated) is best placed to determine if the assigned IR has been successfully answered, which will require coordination with the originator of the IR. If the IR has not been answered, then it will need to be retasked.

2.3.5.   In summary, a clear understanding of command and control is essential for the effective management of PKISR and, once established, allows for the greatest flexibility in making the most out of a finite resource. Effective delegation of command and control from the D/CMS and the effective use of CCIRs and PIRs frees Mission leadership up from being involved in routine decision making on how PKISR assets are tasked.

2.4.   Role of Mission Leadership

2.4.1.   The Mission leadership holds a key role in directing PKISR. The whole process revolves around answering IRs and the finite resources available to do so must be appropriately managed against clear priorities as set out in the IAP. The CCIRs are a critical part of this process since they provide the U2 with clear direction and guidance on what is important to the leadership; the MICM, where available, should be used to ensure that this coordination is happening. The use of PKISR assets must be focused primarily on priority tasking, otherwise a valuable resource is in danger of being misused.

> **Every task undertaken by a PKISR asset must originate from an agreed requirement. That way Mission leadership can understand how their valuable resources are being used and can adjust their priority requirements if PKI-related IRs are not being addressed.**

CHAPTER THREE

3. PKISR in Practice

3.1. Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence Requirements

CCIR

3.1.1. The CCIRs should be relatively broad and will cover a wide variety of aspects. By addressing them, the PKISR process is assisting with decision-making. CCIRs must cover any and all aspects that will affect the ability of the Mission leadership to achieve the mandate. They can include the requirement to understand seasonal weather and the resultant humanitarian impact, knowing more about the ambitions of armed groups, requirements to support election activity, or information relating to threats to UN personnel.

PIR

3.1.2. Once the CCIRs have been identified and ratified by Mission leadership the PIRs can be developed, which are actively managed within the IAP. Each CCIR may have multiple PIRs and it is important that the PIRs are prioritised from the outset in order to make the tasking of PKISR assets as efficient as possible. A PIR will be broad and may, for example, relate to what threats exist to the UN and civilian population from armed groups.

SIR

3.1.3. Once the PIRs are established, they are broken down into SIRs, which go into greater detail and are again prioritised. The example PIR above regarding threats from armed groups relating will be too general to effectively task PKISR assets against and therefore the PIR must be broken down into SIRs to start to be more specific about what information is required. In this example, the SIRs might focus on the various individual armed groups present in the country and include an aspect on unknown groups or the threat of groups from other countries moving into the Mission area.

EEI

3.1.4. The SIRs are then broken down further into EEIs and these are the specific questions that PKISR assets are tasked with answering. Staying with the armed groups theme, the SIR might relate to a new armed group operating in the country called Armed Group X. In the early stages of acquiring information on Armed Group X, the EEI should ask questions such as "who is the leader of Armed Group X?", "what are the main aims of Armed Group X?", "how is command and control exercised within Armed Group X?" and "what are the regional boundaries of Armed Group X?". Depending on the situation, EEIs may focus in on themes such as Child Protection, posing questions such as "does Armed Group X commit violations and abuses against children?" or similar.

3.1.5. As these EEIs start to get answered the IAP is updated to reflect the new information, and once the leader or leaders of Armed Group X have been identified then this can cease to be an active EEI. The more we learn about Armed Group X the more refined the EEIs can become. If the aim of the Mission is to re-integrate Armed Group X the SIR might be adjusted to focus on this and the EEIs become more related to how the Mission encourages the various elements of Armed Group X to reintegrate.

3.2. Translating PIRs into SIRs into EEIs

3.2.1.   The following is an example of a different PIR theme broken down into SIRs and EEIs. It is not an exhaustive example but demonstrates the level of detail required of the EEIs to achieve an effective IAL that can actually be answered. The numbering of the PIR, SIRs and EEIs is important as it allows the PKISR team to quickly identify the origin of the EEI when ensuring that the answer to the question has been delivered to the appropriate client.

PIR	SIR	EEI
1 What threats exist against the IDP Camp?	1.1 What are the ethnic/tribal/social dynamics in the Camp?	1.1.1 What is the ethnic breakdown in the IDP camp?
		1.1.2 Are there any conflicting ethnic groups/tribes within the IDP camp?
		1.1.3 Is there any evidence of changes in the ethnic groups/tribe's laydown within the IDP camp?
		1.1.4 What is the size of the ethnic groups/tribes in the immediate vicinity of the IDP camp?
		1.1.5 Has the size of the ethnic groups/tribes in the immediate vicinity of the IDP camp changed?
		1.1.6 Who are the local ethnic groups/tribes' leadership in the vicinity of the IDP camp?
		1.1.7 What is the composition of the IDP camp in terms of age/sex and are unaccompanied children present in significant numbers?
	1.2 What armed group activity is there in the area?	1.2.1 What armed groups are operating in the local area?
		1.2.2 What are the known armed groups TTPs?
		1.2.3 What are the size of the armed groups in the local area?
		1.2.4 Do any of the armed groups have relations with the local community/UN/host nation?
		1.2.5 What weapons capability do the armed groups have?
		1.2.6 Are there any combat indicators associated with the armed groups in terms of uniform or clothing?
		1.2.7 Where are the armed groups based?
		1.2.8 Are there children associated with the armed groups and are the armed groups known for committing violations and abuses against children?
	1.3 What weather considerations exist?	1.3.1 When is the rainy season?
		1.3.2 How long does the rainy season last for?
		1.3.3 In what way is the IDP camp at risk of flooding?
		1.3.4 What are the road conditions into and out of the IDP camp?
	1.4 What is the IDP relationship with UN and national institutions?	1.4.1 Is there any evidence of propaganda/media directed at the IDP camp (positive or negative)?
		1.4.2 Are the IDPs supportive of the UN and national institutions?
		1.4.3 Is there any nationally provided security for the IDP camp?
		1.4.4 Is there any NGO activity within the IDP camp or in the local area?
	1.5 Who are the key leadership within IDP camp?	1.5.1 Are there any identifiable leaders within the IDP camp?
		1.5.2 Is there evidence of any formal meetings taking place within the IDP camp?
		1.5.3 Do the leaders have any obvious political connections?
		1.5.4 What is the media outlook of the IDP leadership?
		1.5.5 Do the leaders have any stated agendas or goals?
		1.5.6 Is the leadership connected to armed groups in any way?
	1.6 What freedom of movement exists within and into/out of the camp?	1.6.1 Are there any restricted areas within the IDP camp?
		1.6.2 Who is controlling the restricted areas?
		1.6.3 Is there evidence of illegal taxation within the IDP camp?
		1.6.4 Are explosive ordnance threats present which restrict movement?

Figure 3: Beginnings of the Force IAP

3.2.2.   The Mission leadership do not need to be exposed to the level of detail within the IAP. It is the PKI professionals' job to develop the PIRs and gain approval for them ahead of the more detailed SIR and EEI work. The SIRs and EEIs are for internal use to facilitate the delivery of the PKI effort in support of the IAP.

3.3. Force Peacekeeping-Intelligence Acquisition Plan

3.3.1.   The IAP is the living document that captures all the PIRs, SIRs and EEIs and which PKI discipline or unit is capable of answering the questions within the EEIs. The Force level IAP should be controlled by the IAP Manager, who is responsible to the U2 to report on how the IAP is being actioned. Sectors and battalions should also have their own IAP focussing on the sector commander's and battalion commander's PIRs and managed by the G2 and S2 respectively. These IAPs will become much more regionally focussed but the concept is still the same. The sector or battalion may have their own organic PKISR assets that they can task against their IAP.[6] They can also raise an RFI to the Force or a different Sector to assist in answering the EEIs.

3.3.2.   In its simplest form, the IAP is a spreadsheet that lists all the PIRs, SIRs and EEIs and the appropriate PKI acquisition disciplines capable of answering the EEIs. In order to provide an oversight of the process to acquire the information capable of answering the EEIs the following questions should be answered on the IAP:

   a.   **Who** could acquire the information?

   b.   **What** information needs to be acquired?

   c.   **Where** to acquire it: normally Named Areas of Interest (NAIs)?

   d.   **How** are sources going to be protected and kept confidential?

   e.   **When** is the information required (No Later Than / Latest Time Intelligence is Of Value)?

   f.   **How** is the acquisition unit to disseminate the acquired information?

3.3.3.   The entire IAP is a management document for the U2 and should not be used as the format for tasking as it is too complex for individual acquisition entities to interpret and action. The IAL is the appropriate means to communicate tasking to each acquisition capability, and this document is discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.

3.3.4.   The following table is an example of the headings for the IAP. The section relating to the "acquiring unit" refers to those PKISR capabilities that *could* answer the question to assist in the development of the IAL, which is when the tasking will actually be formally assigned to a PKISR unit. The NAI column relates to a geographic area as defined by the U2. The No Later Than (NLT) column indicates the latest time by which the acquisition must be conducted, while the Latest Time Information is Of Value (LTIOV) column indicates the latest time by which the requesting unit must receive the information in the format they requested it. The difference between with NLT and LTIOV times is therefore the period available to the PKI analyst to turn the information acquired into the product that is needed; this should be kept in mind when defining these times. For example, an in-depth and highly detailed analytical product regarding a village's vulnerability to attack may take considerable time to generate, since analysts will likely have to work with various sources of information and fuse them together to satisfy the task. If the village in question is reported to be at potential risk of attack on, for example, 1 June there is no point acquiring the

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[6] An organic PKISR asset is one which operates as an integral part of a relatively low-level unit and which tends not to directly support higher-level formations; for example, small hand-launched UAS that are carried by a military patrol as part of their standard equipment.

imagery to support the analysis on 1 June as this will leave no time to analyse the information. Careful forward-planning, whenever possible, is therefore essential.

PIR	SIR	EEI	Acquiring Unit				Source Protection Considerations	NAI	NLT	LTIOV
			A Coy	B Coy	UAS	UN Ob				

Figure 4: Suggested IAP Headings

3.3.5.   It is highly unlikely that a Mission will have sufficient PKISR assets to acquire all necessary information to satisfy every EEI. However, it is important to maintain a complete IAP to assist the Mission in understanding where there are gaps in acquisition capabilities. For example, if several EEIs can only ever be answered by GPKI and the Mission has no GPKI acquisition assets then without the evidence to support this gap it is difficult for the Mission to provide evidence of the requirement for additional acquisition capabilities. A consistent record over time that shows persistent PKI gaps is an important piece of management information for Mission leadership. Detail on appropriate tasking against the PKI disciplines will be covered in Chapter Four.

3.4.   Prioritisation

3.4.1.   The effective prioritisation of IRs is key to efficient closure of PKI gaps. There is no simple shortcut to conducting the prioritisation process and therefore it is essential that those involved in the management of PKISR have a clear understanding of the Mission's priorities to produce an accurate IAL. The Mission mandate must be central to the formulation of the high-level priorities, and the areas of application outlined in the Peacekeeping-Intelligence Policy including, in relevant Missions, the protection of civilians and the promotion / protection of human rights must also be duly factored into the process.

3.4.2.   Whilst the Force IAP is a very important part of the process and it exists due to the knowledge gaps within the Mission, it cannot be the only focus of the acquisition process. It should be the basis for prioritising other Mission requirements that need PKISR support. Further, the Mission will conduct operations or humanitarian efforts that must also be supported with PKISR to enhance decision making.

> **It is very important that the PKISR section be represented during Mission planning and update meetings to ensure that they have a clear understanding of the latest Mission leadership priorities.**

3.4.3.   It is impractical for Mission leadership to be involved in decision making on how the IRs are prioritised to generate the IAL. Therefore, a process must be put in place within the PKISR section to establish how the prioritisation occurs. By using the IAP as the foundation for prioritising the U2 has a start point to which additional requirements can be added. Without this structured approach, an overwhelming list of questions will likely need to be addressed and prioritised. If the U2 starts with the IRs from the IAP then the majority of questions will already be prioritised, making the process much easier.

3.4.4. A degree of subjective judgement is required to determine where the IRs generated by internal and external sources are placed in terms of priority. The IRs from the IAP are already prioritised and the focus should be on where the remaining IRs are placed to produce the IAL. Factors such as geographic area, timeliness, threat to life, planning to support future operations, human rights risks and access to alternative means of acquisition are all factors to take into consideration to build on the priorities already set by the MICM.

3.4.5. The most efficient way to carry out the task is for one person within the PKISR team to be responsible for producing the IAL. In the early stages of establishing the process, a second person should check and critique prioritisation decisions where appropriate. Attempting to generate the IAL as a team task is likely to prove to be an inefficient use of time. Once the process is established and there is regular general consensus on the prioritisation, the cross check can be done only in cases of particularly difficult decisions being required.

3.4.6. A key part of establishing if the prioritisation process is appropriate is to maintain a management database of the completion of the daily IAL. Accurate record keeping of which IRs are satisfied and which are not is an essential part of both ensuring that the prioritisation process is appropriate, and to identify emerging gaps in acquisition capability. If, for example, IRs received from external originators (in the form of RFIs) are rarely answered then perhaps a subconscious bias has been in effect favouring IRs from within the PKI system, or perhaps the RFI-derived IRs in question cannot be satisfied by the assets available to the Mission. In either case, this is important information to capture.

3.5. Force Peacekeeping-Intelligence Acquisition List

3.5.1. Regardless of the source of the IR, a complete list must be maintained in priority order to support the development of the IAL. The IAL will assign IRs against the most appropriate acquisition capability. The IAL should be relatively simple and not involve complex details that may confuse the acquisition unit. It should focus on the who, what, where, when, how.

IAP Ref	IR	Indicators for reporting	Acquiring Unit				LTIOV	Dissemination
			A Coy	B Coy	UAS	UN Ob		

Figure 5: Suggested IAL Headings

3.5.2. The unit responsible for answering the IRs will consider everything they have been tasked to acquire for that day[7] and will plan to answer as many IRs as possible in the most efficient way. It is important to include the "LTIOV" column to allow the acquisition unit to plan effectively and ensure that they meet the timing deadlines for the client.

3.5.3. Once the IR is incorporated into the acquisition unit's daily tasking the unit must be prepared to analyse the information it acquires in accordance with the IR, focussing specifically on the "indicators for reporting".[8] As part of the detail within the IR, the speed at which a response

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[7] It should be noted that the nature of some PKISR units means they will be out in the field for several days at a time and this should be factored in when assigning tasking against the unit.

[8] The indicators for reporting should be developed by the PKISR team to ensure that as much information is included by the acquisition unit to answer the IR.

is required and in what format should be considered. For example, if the unit requiring the information needs it as soon as possible, this could be communicated by voice over radio, via text or a messaging format such as Teams or Skype; this detail should be included in the "dissemination" column.

3.5.4.   It is not always necessary to produce a formal PKI product, but where the required information has been passed through other means, such as a radio message, it is important for the acquisition unit to confirm with the client if the information acquired answers their IR. Once this has been determined PKISR Ops must be informed if the acquisition has been successful. If it has been successful then the IR can be removed from the IAL. If not, then it will need to be reprioritised against the following day's IAL.

3.5.5.   The following graphic describes the PKISR process and how it links with the MPKI cycle. The PKISR process enables the Acquisition step of the MPKI cycle and delivers information to allow analysis to take place. The traditional start point of the PKISR process is the generation of the IR, which is then prioritised against other IRs to create a plan. The plan is then developed into the daily IAL which represents the tasking for the acquisition units. The results of the IAL are analysed and the clients of the IRs are consulted to determine if the information acquired answers the question. If the answer is yes then the IR is marked as complete, if the answer is partially the IR must be adapted to focus on the unanswered part and resubmitted for prioritisation, and if the answer is no then the whole IR is resubmitted for prioritisation.


Figure 6: PKISR Process

3.6   Tasking Process

3.6.1.   The management of an IR as it moves through the acquisition tasking process will differ slightly depending on whether it was generated by analysts within the PKI system or whether it originated from an RFI received from outside the PKI system. The following flow charts show the slightly different management of each IR and can be used as a guide to develop the associated processes in a mission setting.


**Figure 7: Development of an IR originating from within the PKI system**

Figure 8: Development of an IR originating from an external RFI

3.6.2.   Regardless of the origin of the IR, good communication is required throughout the process to ensure that there is an accurate picture of what acquisition is planned and what has been executed. This is essential during the results phase to ensure that there is clear understanding regarding the success of the acquisition, so that further acquisition tasking is not expended unnecessarily on an IR that has been fully satisfied.

3.7.   Levels of Analysis

3.7.1.   As part of the acquisition process, it is important to define the different levels of analysis. This will provide a common framework of understanding for the IR originator, the Chief PKISR, and the acquisition unit assigned the tasking. This framework should be used for the majority of acquisition; however, units that are out in the field on reconnaissance missions or HPKI operatives should strive to pass time-sensitive information within the timeframe specified, noting that more complete reporting will likely have to be outside of the timelines below. The following levels should be used to describe the timeframe and format that acquisition units should use to disseminate responses to IRs.

Level	Time frame	Format	Level of detail
1	Immediately – within 10 minutes	Voice or text	Threat to life or time sensitive information
2	Within 2 hours of event capture	Text or basic product	Basic information relating to EEI, likely single source
3	Within 24 hours of event capture	Detailed product	Detailed analysis of event capture, possibly multiple sources
4	Within 72 hours of event capture	Advanced product	Multi source document with detailed analysis and assessment

Figure 9: Levels of Analysis

3.7.2.   The IAL should identify what level of analysis is expected of the acquisition unit and whether more than one product could be expected. For example, the generation of a Level 2

product to support initial planning might be required while the requestor waits for a more detailed product to be generated. Note that it would be unrealistic to expect every acquisition unit to generate a Level 4 report if they do not have the appropriate resources. For example, a Tactical Peacekeeping-Intelligence Unit should be capable of generating an advanced Level 4 report but a small UAS unit will likely not be able to produce anything more than a Level 3 report. It is essential that Chief PKISR has a thorough understanding of the capabilities of all acquisition units within the Mission to ensure expectations of analysis are managed.

3.7.3.   If, during the analysis of information acquired by PKISR sources, it becomes apparent that a potential threat to life has been identified then the unit or analyst in question should *immediately* take all necessary measures to alert the relevant units/components without delay, regardless of what the original analytical timelines were. Any PKISR asset may come across such information at any time, so all PKISR units – and the wider Force / Mission command structures that work with them such as the Joint Operations Centre (JOC) and JMAC – must have a clear communications plan in place before any operation as to how they will rapidly relay threat to life information up their chain of command. This applies to all stages of the analysis process. For example, an airborne PKISR asset which identifies a surface-to-air threat system during a flight must have the means and plan to immediately communicate this to the Mission aviation team and other UN aircraft in the area. Equally, an analyst working on imagery acquired two days earlier who identifies apparent illegal armed groups mustering in a forest to prepare an attack on a UN position or local village should immediately alert the Force chain of command so that a warning of the potential threat can be issued.

Immediately relaying threat to life warnings via the appropriate channels is a priority for all personnel. In such cases, product generation timelines or the lapsed time since the acquisition of information is irrelevant and must never be used as an excuse to delay conveying this information.

3.5. Dissemination

3.8.1. Once the IR has been answered in accordance with the requested level of analysis the next step within the process is dissemination. In all instances the IAP Manager must receive the outputs that have been produced to allow them to update the IAP, but also to retain the information in a central repository for future reference. If the IR originated from within the PKI system then the completion of the task can be verified by the IAP Manager. If the IR was generated by an external RFI then only the requestor can verify if the response meets their requirement.

3.8.2. It is essential that the dissemination requirements are included in the RFI to ensure this process can run smoothly. This is particularly important when the acquisition unit is expected to disseminate threat information, as alluded to above. For example, if a UAS unit is tasked to provide overwatch of a UN camp following PKI reporting that a hostile mortar team is active in the area, it is critical that the UAS unit knows exactly who to contact, and how, if they spot suspicious activity. The role of the RFI manager is essential in this process and RFIs must be rejected if they do not include dissemination requirements appropriate to the task.

3.8.3. Once dissemination is complete the IAP must be updated to reflect open and complete IRs to ensure that an effective IAL is generated for the next day. Once the process is established, IALs can be generated up to 3 days in advance with only minor adjustments, taking into account

IRs that were not able to be acquired on a given day. Whilst creation of the IAL is a dynamic process, this does not necessarily mean it has to be completed at the last minute.

3.9. PKISR Management Board

Since the number and capabilities of available PKISR assets will vary hugely between every Mission, the appropriate level of bespoke PKISR management processes will also vary. For Missions with few PKISR assets there may be no need to conduct bespoke activities such as the Management Board detailed below.

However, Missions with extensive and/or complex PKISR assets may find it useful to utilise such a Management Board or incorporate appropriate elements into their existing processes.

3.9.1. In order to keep the Mission leadership up to date with PKISR activities it is useful to produce a monthly summary of activity. Providing a visual representation of how PKISR assets are being used will assist the leadership in determining if the priorities they have set for the U2 are correct. This briefing can be part of routine Mission meetings and does not necessarily need to be held during a dedicated session. Indeed, it can be beneficial for it to be incorporated into wider meetings to increase the visibility of the use of PKISR assets across Mission staff, always while giving due consideration to confidentiality concerns.

3.9.2. This monthly briefing to the Mission leadership is likely best supported by the PKISR team who are tasked with regularly conducting a PKISR Management Board (PKIMB) on the utilisation of PKISR assets. The frequency of this board will depend on the number of available PKISR acquisition assets and the complexity of the Mission. The PKIMB is an important part of the PKISR process to ensure effective management oversight of activities and to confirm that appropriate command and control is being executed.

3.9.3. The PKIMB can stand alone as a separate meeting or be incorporated into other PKI-related meetings such as the MICM. In some Missions, the JMAC fulfils an important leading role in the MICM that directs and oversees the PKI cycle within the Mission, of which MPKI is a part. If the MICM mechanism is not active within the Mission, then the PKIMB should be led by Chief U2.

3.9.4. The purpose of the PKIMB is to validate the priorities to support the development of the IAL. The IAL is a daily process but the PKIMB should not be; a simple, regular confirmation that the PIRs remain valid and correctly prioritised is all that is required to provide the PKISR team with clear direction and guidance. The PKIMB can also be the venue to discuss upcoming operations and PKISR support to the planning and execution process, to further assist in prioritising the resultant IRs.

3.9.5. The status of PKISR capabilities must also be discussed to ensure a common understanding of availability and to provide a formal mechanism by which to monitor persistent serviceability issues or other concerns. Emerging gaps in acquisition capability can also be discussed to support Mission leadership decision making regarding whether to request additional

assets. There is no set format for the PKIMB but a suggested slide pack is provided at Annex A to this chapter, to be used as a framework by Missions that have not developed their own.

3.10. PKIMB Participation

3.10.1. The PKIMB should be organised by Chief PKISR but be chaired by Chief U2 at a minimum. Appropriate participation by other Mission elements such as the JMAC and UNPOL should be encouraged. All the major elements of the PKISR team are required to brief and the equivalent elements within the sectors and representatives from each of the acquisition capabilities should also be required to attend remotely via electronic means. Participation should not be limited to those listed and attendance should be encouraged from across all elements of the Mission, particularly the U6 or Field Technology Services (FTS) given the reliance of PKISR on robust communications networks. In larger Missions it is possible that the Mission leadership might wish to chair the PKIMB, in which case an additional monthly update is unlikely to be required since use of PKISR assets will be discussed during the PKIMB and Mission leadership can use this forum to provide direction and guidance.

3.11. PKIMB Format

3.11.1. The PKIMB should start with a PKI update. Ideally this will incorporate the U2, JMAC and UNPOL elements to ensure a complete, common Mission picture of activity and assessment. It is important that finite PKISR assets are used to support the whole Mission and the PKIMB is an excellent mechanism to bring the military, police and civilian elements together for this purpose.

3.11.2. Following the PKI update a review of the previous month's activity should be conducted. A valuable metric to track is the percentage of acquisition effort against each of the IRs. This will assist in determining if the weight of activity is appropriate based on the ongoing situation in the Mission. If it is determined that there is a disproportionate effort against a certain area, then adjustments to prioritisation can take place. A similar effect can be achieved by articulating the percentage of acquisition effort against various task themes, such as support to patrol, fixed-site protection, protection of civilians, monitoring of illegal armed groups, etc.

3.11.3. This portion of the PKIMB should also highlight any persistent inability to address certain IRs, which must include a detailed discussion on why it has not been possible to acquire sufficient information against them. This is an important part of the process to develop a clear picture of acquisition asset gaps, which will help Mission leadership determine whether they wish to request additional numbers of a certain acquisition asset or request a type of acquisition asset that is not currently available to them.

3.11.4. The next step within the PKIMB is to review at least the PIR portion of the IAP. It is unnecessary to review the IAP in its entirety as there is too much detail for such an audience. However, the high-level priorities must be discussed and adjusted where appropriate. The entire IAP should be comprehensively reviewed at least every 6 months, but ideally once a quarter, to ensure that the prioritisation within the IAP is appropriate.

3.11.5. At this stage the Mission's focus for the coming month should be briefed to ensure that the leadership and staff have a shared picture of upcoming acquisition efforts. The briefing should include aspects such as the operational focus, threats, and the human rights and humanitarian picture to allow for a discussion on the relative priority of activity to support the development of the IAL. It is also important to manage expectations regarding PKISR support. For example, if the planning staff within the U3 and U5 expect UAS support to be available for an upcoming operation,

but using the UAS to monitor an increase in IDP activity is deemed a higher priority, the planning staff need to be made aware so that they can factor this in. If the UAS is considered essential for force protection, it may be appropriate for the planning staff to delay the pre-planned operation until the IDP monitoring is complete. This highlights why the PKIMB should be fully supported by staff from across the Mission and must not be regarded as purely U2 business.

3.11.6. The final portion of the PKIMB should focus on the availability of PKISR acquisition assets to the widest extent possible. Patrol tasks should be discussed to emphasise the fact that every UN military individual is a potential source of acquisition and that patrol reporting is an important part of the acquisition process. In the early stages of a Mission, patrol reports can be reviewed by the U2 and the IAP updated with any relevant information. As the process matures, patrols could be allocated specific tasking against the IAP to maximise their potential as acquisition assets.

3.11.7. For airborne acquisition assets it is useful to capture management data such as 'hours tasked' against 'hours flown'. Other entities within the Mission need to gather such data for a variety of reasons but the U2 must maintain an overview of how successful the assets have been in actually performing their key role as an acquisition asset. This helps with decision making on the long-term value of the asset to the Mission.

3.11.8. On completion of the PKIMB an appropriate summary of key points should be captured to brief to the Mission leadership and support the prioritisation process. If the Mission leadership chair the PKIMB, then this will not be necessary for their awareness since it will be discussed in the meeting, but the output must still be captured and stored for record-keeping purposes.

**Annex A to
Chapter Three of
PKISR Staff Handbook**

EXAMPLE OF PKIMB PROCESS

RFI Review

- Number of RFIs returned to unit for reworking
- Number of outstanding RFIs
- Number of RFIs answered in the past month

Briefed by RFI Manager

Next Month's Acquisition

- Geographic and operational focus

Briefed by PKISR Plans

Acquisition Capabilities Status

- By acquisition unit
  - Serviceability issues
  - Unit rotation issues

Briefed by PKISR Plans

Any Questions?

CHAPTER FOUR

4. The Peacekeeping-Intelligence Disciplines

In order to effectively task PKI acquisition capabilities it is important to know the strength of the individual disciplines, and which is most appropriately tasked against the IRs.

The Mission will not necessarily have access to a wide variety of acquisition capabilities and must make the best use of those available. However, it is important to capture the extent to which the IRs are unable to support development of a clear picture of acquisition gaps. This is particularly important to assist with describing what capabilities are required and to determine if they can be resourced by either a commercial solution or by a Troop Contributing Country.

The following is a brief overview of the PKI disciplines and the various considerations for tasking their associated assets. In all cases, it must be remembered that all PKI activities must be carried out in accordance with the boundaries laid out in the DPO PKI Policy and with due regard for all relevant considerations regarding human rights, international law, and the principle of "do no harm".

The matter of Host State permission to operate PKISR assets must always be considered. Although PKISR personnel are unlikely to be directly involved with the procurement of assets, they should be sure to maintain awareness of any restrictions that a Host State may have placed on the operation of certain capabilities.

Advice should be sought from Mission Legal personnel if there is any doubt as to whether a certain capability can be operated in a specific setting.

4.1. Geospatial Peacekeeping-Intelligence (GPKI)[9]

4.1.1. The GPKI discipline refers to the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information in response to PKI requirements. The production of GPKI combines, *inter alia*, mapping, charting, imagery, imagery peacekeeping-intelligence (IPKI) and geospatial information. The fundamental difference between GPKI and the sub-discipline of Imagery Peacekeeping-Intelligence (IPKI) is that the outputs of IPKI will only use imagery to provide the assessment, in contrast to GPKI outputs which fuse imagery with geospatial information. Geospatial information is data that refers to a physical location on earth; examples include transportation networks, the shapes/locations of buildings, and terrain data. Terrain data comprises elements such as elevation, transportation networks, waterways, and vegetation, and is particularly useful in creating three-dimensional information products such as area of interest studies, dead ground assessments or slope analysis.

4.1.2   There are usually a variety of GPKI capabilities available to a Mission, including the potential access to a number of IPKI platforms (ground, air, and space-based). However, there is typically a cost associated with these resources whether they are allocated within a Mission as

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[9] For more information refer to the "Geospatial Peacekeeping-Intelligence (GPKI)" Guidelines (DPO 2023.07, published 1 September 2023).

part of the military, civilian, or police components, or whether they are commercial assets/resources that can be accessed via a pre-established mechanism or contract.

IPKI platforms

4.1.3. Satellite imagery is an example of a commercial resource that can be accessed via a contractual mechanism, available via a Mission's Geospatial Intelligence Section (GIS) within the Field Technology Section (FTS). Satellite imagery platforms are excellent for providing wide area coverage of an area, often with high enough resolution to also allow detailed focus into specific sub-areas of interest. Satellite imagery is best exploited using specific tools designed to analyse the imagery, which will allow the analyst to adjust the image to sharpen aspects and gain far more PKI value than using basic tools. Regular satellite imagery tasking can result in building awareness of pattern of life over time in areas of interest such as border crossings or IDP/refugee camps. This analysis can be outsourced to a commercial provider, but a detailed set of requirements/questions must be provided to make the most of the service. Alternatively, if the Mission has imagery analysts then the raw data can be procured and re-used several times for different products. It is also possible to seek analytical support via a Mission's GIS team, who can link the requestor to certain UN entities that offer this service.

4.1.4. The Geospatial Information Section (GIS) team within a Mission will have ready access to an archive of imagery, via a UNHQ-managed contract, which can be used to support operational planning or provide a baseline image to show how things have changed using other GPKI assets within the Mission. It is also possible to request satellites collect more up-to-date imagery of specific areas, but this will come at a cost which must be approved by the Director of Mission Support (DMS) or Chief of Mission Support (CMS) through FTS. Other avenues should be explored before committing to requesting new satellite imagery, such as checking if the satellite imagery is already available through free resources or if airborne capabilities such as UAS or manned PKISR aircraft could acquire appropriate imagery instead. The GIS team at UNHQ in New York and the Analytics and Location Intelligence Unit (ALIU) in Valencia, Spain, are sources both of advice on how to access satellite imagery and of imagery analysis capability; Missions with an interest in satellite imagery should approach their local GIS focal point in the first instance to affect an introduction if appropriate. A sample satellite imagery request form is at Annex A to this chapter.

4.1.5. Larger UAS or manned PKISR aircraft offer the ability to carry relatively capable sensors of various types over distances that can typically run into hundreds of km. This offers a Mission the ability to observe activities and terrain features of interest that may be too far, too difficult, or too dangerous for ground-based patrols to reach and observe. The speed of such aircraft is also a significant advantage, offering the ability to react much faster over large distances than would otherwise be possible. The range, sensors, carrying capacity and amount of time the asset can stay airborne will vary according to the aircraft type, along with other considerations such as temperature, winds, and required operating altitude. As a general rule, UAS will be slower than manned aircraft, but can often remain airborne for longer periods of time, offering the ability to provide continuous coverage of events such as ground patrols, security operations, or other lengthy activities where unbroken situational awareness is required. This long flight time also makes UAS well-suited to providing persistent surveillance of illegal armed groups, where the ability to let analysts build a picture of activity and locations associated with such groups can be invaluable in building an understanding of their locations, operations, and the threat they pose to civilians and UN forces.

4.1.6. Smaller UAS, of the kind that can be carried by one person, are better used for more

tactical tasking such as overwatch of a convoy to look ahead for potential armed group ambush or Improvised Explosive Device (IED) emplacement activity, or for enhanced observation of the area surrounding a fixed UN position. A good communication link between the UAS operator and the wider unit or units in the area is essential to translate the information feed into useful early warning or situational awareness. Even if the employment of such an IPKI asset is tactical in nature, the information it acquires should always be fed back into the wider Mission PKI cycle to provide maximum value to the PKI effort as a whole.

4.1.7.   It is also possible to use fixed cameras as a GPKI capability, which is particularly useful for covering areas where persistent surveillance is required, such as within built up areas. These are best used as Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras which can provide an excellent overview of an area of interest. There is an element of inflexibility with CCTV as they cannot be rapidly relocated and therefore a detailed assessment of the area must be conducted to ensure they are sighted in the most appropriate locations. Furthermore, the nature of fixed cameras means that they will be blind to areas of dead ground and they will not be able to follow activity behind buildings. They should be used as a blended capability but when used correctly they offer an excellent, cost-effective means of surveillance.

IPKI sensors

4.1.8.   The most commonly available imagery sensor type is Electro-Optical (EO), which can be found on almost all UAS regardless of their size, as well as most manned PKISR aircraft and many commercial imagery satellites. Imagery derived from an EO sensor has the advantage of being easily understood by non-analysts given that it offers a familiar view, albeit from overhead, often in full colour. This makes both still images and Full Motion Video (FMV) derived from EO sensors extremely accessible and highly suited to both real-time situational awareness applications and use in briefing products that will be consumed by individuals without a professional background in imagery analysis or PKI. However, EO imagery is only useful during daytime as it relies on the reflected light from the sun to work. An EO image can also be affected by heavy rain, clouds, smoke, dust, or other atmospheric characteristics that will obstruct the sensor's view of the subject.

4.1.9   Infra-Red (IR) sensors are often found paired with EO sensors (in which case the configuration will typically be referred to as "EO/IR") but can also be found operating on their own in certain applications. IR sensors work by sensing the IR energy that all objects emit, measuring it, and turning the result into an electronic image that the human eye can understand. Since IR sensors do not rely on daylight in the same way that EO sensors do, they are particularly useful during nighttime when heat sources such as people, campfires, vehicle engines, etc will be especially obvious on the image. However, they can also offer great value during daytime since they can detect IR signatures that may not be obvious to the human eye or EO sensors, such as the body heat of individuals concealed in foliage, or the hot remains of a campfire that have been recently extinguished. An IR image is also a useful indicator of activity which is not possible to derive from an EO source, such as the heat from a parked vehicle's engine indicating that it has been recently used. However, in common with an EO sensor, an IR sensor will also suffer from degraded performance in certain weather conditions such as dust and cloud.

4.1.10.   Radar sensors will typically be found carried on manned PKISR aircraft or larger UAS. Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) sensors emit radar energy which is reflected back from the subject to the sensor; this return is then processed and will typically be presented as a black and white image. A SAR image will require specialised imagery analysis training to exploit since it is difficult for an untrained person to make sense of the image, which will not be as recognisable as

an EO/IR image. Due to the fact that the radar return will be particularly strong from hard-edged shapes such as buildings and vehicles, SAR sensors are well-suited to detecting artificial structures and the presence of human activity. They are also particularly useful for monitoring environmental events such as flooding, offering the ability to quickly map which areas have been submerged and which remain passable by ground routes, making SAR imagery of great value during certain humanitarian scenarios. Change detection may be possible from a SAR sensor, where small changes can be identified by special software between two SAR images taken of the exact same area at different times; this may allow identification of tyre marks, footprints, or disturbed earth. SAR sensors are unaffected by most weather conditions and can be tasked during the day and at night.

4.1.11. In addition, some SAR sensors may be capable of a Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) function, which will identify moving objects that can either be investigated using other sensors, such as EO, or combined with geospatial data to generate specific products. GMTI sensors are well-suited to wide area surveillance tasks; the large area that can be covered allows for the efficient identification of hotspots when monitoring, for example, transhumance or smuggling networks. Objects of interest may be tracked over large distances to develop understanding of activity. This can be used to produce, amongst other outputs, traffic pattern analysis to show which road/routes are most or least used by populations, identify new routes that have appeared which could indicate a civilian need to bypass a threat on the usual route, or identify potential smuggling/armed group movements in cases where movements are detected in unusual areas.

4.1.12 Hyperspectral (HSI) and Multispectral (MSI) sensors are a specific kind of EO sensor that PKISR personnel should be aware of. Although not common within a peacekeeping mission context at present, the technology is widely employed in various civilian and military applications and such sensors may be available to peacekeeping missions in the future. HSI/MSI sensors employ specialised cameras which record the spectral information – essentially the unique way in which all objects reflect light – of every pixel within the image they capture. This results in the ability to detect and categorise the materials present in the camera's field of view, which will be processed into a two-dimensional colour-coded image. Applications include assessing the condition of crops, identifying changes in land use, or the presence of hazardous materials. It must be noted that HSI/MSI sensors require in-depth pre-mission planning to use effectively, including the requirement to provide the sensor with information regarding substance(s) of interest prior to the mission. Due to the sensor being an EO one, and thus reliant on reflected light, it cannot operate in the dark and can be negatively affected by adverse weather conditions.

4.1.13 A final IPKI sensor that is not found in current peacekeeping mission settings, but which could have applicability in the future, is Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR). These sensors operate on a similar principle to radar, but instead employs light to provide an accurate 3D model of the earth's surface: a laser is emitted which strikes the ground and the time taken for it to be reflected back determines the exact distance from the object to the sensor. Such sensor data, when combined with other geospatial information, can be used to produce terrain elevation data, identify flat land suitable for helicopter landing sites, identify holes in roads that may be indicators of suspicious activity, help to locate hidden tunnel entrances, and in certain circumstances provide mapping of forest floors through foliage canopies. This is a highly specialised sensor type which relies on a niche skillset to effectively task and exploit, but which is included here for awareness.

Tasking of IPKI assets

4.1.14.   The specific combination of a sensor type and the platform it is mounted on will determine the type of tasking for which the resultant asset it is best suited. For example, the same EO/IR sensor will offer very different capabilities depending on whether it is mounted on a UAS, a manned PKISR aircraft, a ground vehicle, or a static mast. A quick-reference summary of asset-to-task matching considerations is at Annex B to this chapter.

4.1.15.   As a general rule, IPKI and wider GPKI tasks tend to be related to the need to identify activity or change, making mobile platforms – especially airborne or space-based ones – a particularly good fit for carrying IPKI sensors. However, the potential value of static platforms fitted with sensors, such as tethered surveillance balloons or masts, should not be discounted. While static assets can be harder to task creatively due to the inherent inflexibility of their operating area, if integrated into a systematic acquisition plan they can be valuable in supporting fixed-point security understanding and in monitoring atmospherics around UN locations, IDP camps, population centres, main roads, etc.

4.1.16.   These considerations apply to all of the PKI disciplines but are presented here due to the fact that IPKI sensors tend to be the most frequently employed mobile acquisition resource in peacekeeping Missions. Regardless of the PKI discipline, numerous considerations exist when choosing between available assets, including the frequency with which the activity to be observed is expected to change, how long observation of the activity is required for, the distance from the nearest UN base location, the size of the area to be observed, whether there is a threat of ground fire against aircraft, etc. It is crucial that PKISR Planners have a detailed understanding of each PKISR asset's capabilities, as well as the operating environment they will be going into, so that the appropriate asset-to-task matching can take place.

**A *sensor* captures information.
A *platform* carries a sensor.
An *asset* is a sensor combined with a platform.**

The unique characteristics of each PKISR asset must be considered when developing acquisition tasks to ensure the correct asset-to-task matching occurs.

4.2.   Signals Peacekeeping-Intelligence (SPKI)

4.2.1. There are undoubtedly clear benefits to the use of SPKI in UN peacekeeping missions, such as providing a Mission with timely and direct insights into the plans or activities of illegal armed groups that can support both PoC and the safety and security of peacekeepers. However, there are a number of critical factors that must be taken into consideration well ahead of any future deployment of SPKI capabilities. Chief amongst these will be the need to engage with the Host State's judicial system to determine the boundaries of what information can and cannot be acquired to support implementation of the mandate, as well as engagement with the Host State's Government to gauge the extent to which they would be willing to accept the operation of SPKI capabilities within their territory.

4.2.2. To that end, the PKISR Staff Handbook acknowledges SPKI as an important and valuable discipline, but specific guidance on how to manage the capability will only be practical once the policy and framework to facilitate the legal process is in place.

4.3. Human Peacekeeping-Intelligence (HPKI)[10]

4.3.1. HPKI refers to peacekeeping-intelligence derived from information acquired from, and provided by, human sources. It uses human sources as a vector to gather, both actively and passively, information to satisfy IRs. HPKI can only be used in a non-clandestine manner. For this reason, Mission personnel may not operate based on a covert or false identity to acquire peacekeeping-intelligence. HPKI can be a very valuable resource to the Mission but must be managed and conducted by qualified personnel, with full respect for the human rights of the source and others potentially affected. The safety of a HPKI source and their family is paramount and therefore it is essential that any HPKI capability is carefully managed. Missions must keep confidential all information regarding human sources and ensure that measures are in place to safeguard the ongoing safety of the source and their protection against any retaliation and to prevent any actions that could inadvertently lead to harm or violations of their rights.

4.3.2. Under no circumstances should a Mission recruit or otherwise cultivate children as HPKI sources given that they cannot form the necessary free and informed consent to engage in such sensitive activities. This prohibition aligns with the fundamental international legal obligations to protect the rights and welfare of children.

4.3.3. Trained human source handlers must consider what protection risks a potential source may face before they establish any contact. In sensitive settings, merely being seen to be in contact with the UN may arouse suspicion and place a person at risk of reprisals or intimidation. If that risk cannot be contained, the source should not be cultivated. Human source handlers also have to consider contingency protection measures should a source be exposed. Sections with experience in protecting sensitive sources, such as human rights components, can be approached for advice.[11]

4.3.4. In cases of credible threats of physical violence against individual Mission interlocutors or notable personalities or figures, Missions may consider instituting specific measures to protect all affected individuals. Such measures may, for example, include those to prevent and address intimidation and reprisals as a result of cooperation with the Mission, advice and guidance on self-protection measures, documentation and reporting of cases and, in certain cases, the static deployment of armed units outside the individual's residence or the regular patrolling of its environs. Guidance on such measures must first be sought from UN Headquarters.

4.3.5. It can take a significant amount of time to develop a HPKI source, particularly if they need time to gain access to persons of interest. A HPKI source can be used in a passive or active way; they can be asked to report on atmospherics or can be provided with a list of questions to seek answers to (provided care is taken not to reveal too much of the Mission's focus areas by doing so). Both are of immense value to the Mission and a well-placed source can provide invaluable information in supporting the protection of civilians and UN personnel and the human rights of

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[10] For more guidance on the use of HPKI in UN peacekeeping missions, refer to the "Acquisition of Information from Human Sources for Peacekeeping-Intelligence" Guidelines (DPO 2020.05, published 1 September 2020)

[11] For general UN guidance on the protection of sources, see the OHCHR *Manual on Human Rights Monitoring*, Chapter 14: Protection of Victims, Witnesses and Other Cooperating Persons

those at risk. However, as part of the process of managing HPKI sources, understanding the individual's motivation for providing information is necessary to determine their possible bias and to allow analysts to apply an appropriate weighting to the value of the information. No amount of money will be paid, nor gifts offered, to HPKI sources, or their relatives, in remuneration for information.

4.3.6. A HPKI source can be asked to gather information relating to the need to establish an armed group's intent to attack UN personnel or villages. It is possible to gather atmospherics on perceptions towards UN operations but a HPKI source can also support reintegration activity by gauging attitudes of individual fighters.

4.3.7. Information may be received from staff in national intelligence agencies of the Host State or third states; however, HPKI sources cannot be Host State employees or affiliated personnel, unless the relationship has been approved in advance by both the Head of Mission and the Host State. Nonetheless, at all times the Mission's PKI process must remain independent and must not aid, assist or instigate human rights violations by other actors. When interacting with staff from national intelligence agencies, personnel can ask for information from such staff (for those who have NOT been approved as a HPKI source) or task the acquisition of information (for those who HAVE been approved as a HPKI source). However, it is critical to note that there must be careful examination to ensure that personnel do not risk instigating any national human rights violations, notably by asking for, or tasking the acquisition of, information that is likely to be gained through torture or other human rights violations. Information must not be shared with national intelligence contacts if there is a credible risk that it may assist in the violation of human rights, including torture, arbitrary arrest, or the denial of freedom of expression, association, and assembly.

4.3.8. Prior to sharing any PKI or intelligence products, a written agreement must be secured from the recipient stipulating that such products will not be used to instigate or facilitate the commission of human rights violations, breaches of international humanitarian law, or any other domestic or international crime. Similarly, should the mission decide to share a PKI or intelligence product, or should a non-UN entity with whom the mission has shared a PKI or intelligence product request its permission to further share the product with non-UN security forces, particular attention should be paid to ensure their full compliance with the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on United Nations Support to Non-United Nations Security Forces (HRDDP) and DPO Guidelines on PKI sharing.[12]

4.4. Open-Source Peacekeeping-Intelligence (OPKI)[13]

4.4.1. OPKI refers to peacekeeping-intelligence derived from the acquisition, collation, and analysis of publicly available information (PAI) in response to peacekeeping-intelligence requirements. Publicly available information, in any format, includes any freely available information or material posted on the Internet (including social media), published, broadcasted (radio and television), or provided for public consumption. It may also include information that is commercially available to the public for a fee. When paying for publicly available information, users must ensure compliance with all UN rules and regulations, PKI principles, human rights obligations and related guidelines. OPKI has the potential to generate a significant volume of data

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[12] For guidance on the sharing of PKI, refer to the "Sharing Peacekeeping-Intelligence with and Receiving Intelligence from Non-UN and Non-Mission UN Entities" Guidelines (DPO 2022.05, published 1 December 2022)

[13] For more guidance on the use of OPKI in UN peacekeeping missions, refer to the "Open-Source Peacekeeping-Intelligence" Guidelines (DPO 2022.03, published 1 March 2022)

that requires evaluating to determine its usefulness. An OPKI analyst will be best used employing specific tools to allow for the rapid sorting and prioritisation of PAI such as Twitter, YouTube and Facebook feeds. An OPKI analyst must only use PAI in UN peacekeeping operations, but the resource is an excellent addition to the U2.

4.4.2.   An OPKI analyst acts in a passive way by gathering PAI to analyse attitudes, behaviours or perceptions. It is possible to task OPKI with key I&W; for example, alerting the Mission to videos produced by armed group leaders suggesting future attacks against civilians or UN peacekeepers. A skilled OPKI analyst will bear in mind the bias associated with news feeds and most other forms of PAI when providing assessments based on these sources. The analyst must also ensure that any assessments respect human rights principles and do not contribute to actions that could result in harm or violations.

4.4.3.   All Missions should consider a dedicated OPKI analyst within the U2; however, laws and the general attitude of the Host State must be taken into account when determining how much resource to apply against the task. Where a government has a high degree of control of the media, the local population may have restricted access to the open internet and mobile telecommunications. If so, consideration must be given to the level of information that could be acquired from OPKI. PAI may be limited in some countries during periods of unrest and a reliance on this as a significant source of information could become compromised.

4.5   Technical Peacekeeping-Intelligence (TPKI)[14]

4.5.1 TPKI refers to peacekeeping-intelligence derived from the acquisition, exploitation and analysis of military equipment and any material composing a potential threat, including conventional and asymmetric threat weapons systems and associated components. TPKI activities within most peacekeeping operations are heavily concerned with the exploitation of IEDs. Examples of other areas of application are Explosive Remnants of War, Small Arms and Light Weapons, and equipment confiscated from hostile, unaligned or unknown actors, for example micro/mini UAS or digital/hardcopy documents.

4.5.2 Acquisition of technical information from blast sites, IED components, or military or threat equipment is a specialised process and should only be conducted by experts. These tasks, when explosives are present or suspected, are typically conducted by Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams. Other teams that specialize in site or scene exploitation can acquire technical information when explosive dangers are not present. After in-depth examination and analysis, TPKI informs wider PKI analysis. It is used to identify trends and patterns and to develop associations among persons, places, things, and specific activities or incidents. It enables missions to identify threats and adds depth and scope to the PKI picture to answer information requirements.

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[14] Guidelines for the use of TPKI in UN peacekeeping missions are in the process of being written at the time of publication of this Handbook.

EXAMPLE SATELLITE IMAGERY REQUEST FORM

NATIONS UNIES [Full Mission name in French]	[Mission name]	UNITED NATIONS [Full Mission name in English]

[MISSION NAME] REQUEST FOR SATELLITE IMAGERY

ORIGINATOR *(UNIT)*	Click here to enter text	ORDER No.	Click here to enter text
TO	GIS UNIT	PRIORITY	Prio 2 Moderate
INFO NEEDED BEFORE	Click here to enter a date.	DATE OF REQUEST	Click here to enter a date.

SUBJECT-TOPIC : [Brief explanation of required output]
[Additional detail if required]

CONTACT data	
Name:	[Name of person to contact with questions regarding the request]
Phone number (Mobile):	Click here to enter your mobile phone number.
Mail:	[Email address of requestor]

REQUIRED DETAILS
[Explain whether new or existing imagery is required for each Area of Interest (AOI).]
[Consider attaching a list of required center and corner coordinates for each AOI, and/or a shapefile of the respective areas.]
[Detail the dimensions of each AOI in terms of edge length in kilometers.]
[Detail the required resolution of the imagery.]
[If specific AOIs or images are of higher priority than others, call attention to that here.]

COORDINATE (MGRS)	[Coordinates of required area]
RADIUS	☐ 2 KM ☐ 3 KM ☐ 5 KM ☐ SPECIFIED IN THE REQUIRED DETAILS
IF IMAGE IS NOT AVAILABLE NEW ORDER REQUIRED (COSTS INCURRED)	☐ CONFIRMATION
DATASHEET (with DOI)	☐ REQUIRED
Please provide us with the image on the drive [Insert appropriate drive location]	
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION	Click here to enter text

ASSET-TO-TASK MATCHING CONSIDERATIONS

Although not exhaustive, the following factors should be considered by PKISR staff when determining the appropriate asset to assign to a certain task (which is the primary focus of the daily IAL, as detailed in Chapter 2). As stated later in Chapter 7, the use of liaison officers from PKISR units will add great value to this process since they will have in-depth knowledge of how the factors below relate to their specific asset's capabilities and limitations. However, the following provides a good starting point for PKISR planners to work with.

Subject signature. This is a crucial factor when choosing a sensor from the appropriate PKI discipline for the task. Think about what the subject is and how it can be detected. For example, an illegal armed group consists of fighters who can be seen (either directly by human sources or via IPKI sensors such as EO/IR cameras). Any buildings or vehicles associated with the group may also be visually observed, and in addition may be detectable by specialised IPKI sensors such as SAR/GMTI. The fighters may also be heard while moving and talking (by nearby HPKI sources or individuals they can engage with). In the event that SPKI capabilities are available, it may be possible to detect electronic communications from the group. Finally, OPKI sources such as radio broadcasts, internet articles and social media may provide insight into the group's movements and intentions (either directly from themselves or via third parties).

Required information. In the example above, the illegal armed group can be detected in numerous ways. Therefore, to choose the appropriate sensor it is necessary to understand what information is required about the group; this should be detailed in the IR in the form of EEIs. For instance, if the IR states that insight into the group's future intent is required, HPKI assets may be best-suited since they have the greatest chance of acquiring this detail. Alternatively, if the IR specifies that imagery is required of the group's camp in the jungle, then obviously some form of IPKI assets will be necessary.

Coordination of sensors. The PKISR Plans team should consider whether a single sensor type is sufficient to meet the requirement of the task, or whether multiple sensors may be needed in coordination. The strengths and weaknesses of each sensor type must be considered here. For example, if the task is to locate a red truck used by an illegal armed group then a GMTI sensor will be well-placed to detect moving objects across a wide area but cannot confirm their colour. EO sensors can see colour but have limited field of view and cannot observe multiple different locations at the same time. By tasking a GMTI sensor to observe a wide area and report vehicle movement, the EO sensor can be given useful start-points to focus on and see if any of the vehicles are the red truck. Equally, HPKI reports can be used to give cues to OPKI or IPKI sensors, and so on.

Reporting timeline. How quickly is the information required, and in what format? Some requirements may ask for near real-time reporting to support UN forces engaged in an operation, while other requirements may not be time-sensitive since the information will be used in a long-term product that will take several weeks to write. The required processing and analysis timelines must be considered: for example, an HPKI report may have to wait until the unit in question has

returned from the field, or a satellite image may take several days to be available. Conversely, an FMV feed sent from an EO/IR sensor via data downlink directly to a receiving unit, or OPKI alerts via social media, can be available in their raw form almost immediately upon being acquired, though caution must be taken to ensure that decision-makers are aware that such information has yet to be examined and analysed.

Threat. The threat in the area must also be considered. The most pressing aspect is threat to life: would whatever PKISR asset is sent to acquire the information be subject to kinetic threat? This may be the case if an HPKI unit was tasked to acquire information directly on an illegal armed group location, or if a crewed PKISR aircraft was tasked to acquire imagery of an area where surface-to-air weapons may be fired at them, or where GPS jamming routinely causes flight safety issues. Threat to life must be minimised to the greatest degree possible in coordination with guidance from Force/Mission leadership and by ensuring that PKISR Plans keep awareness of the threat situation and coordinate planning with other entities such as the U3, JOC, and JMAC. Other threats may also exist, such as the threat of negative reactions and subsequent anti-UN sentiment to certain activities: for example, tasking a PKISR aircraft to overfly an IDP camp to provide situation updates may provoke a negative response from the inhabitants of the camp. Other activities such as in-person engagement by an HPKI unit may be more relatable and avoid generating undue concern, however engagement methods must always uphold the "do not harm" principle and be aligned with international human rights standards.

Distance and terrain. The distance and terrain over which the PKISR asset would have to travel to get to the area of the task is also an important factor. Air assets are inherently able to move faster than ground assets over long ranges, especially where the terrain is difficult to traverse due to poor roads, seasonal flooding, etc. In cases where an asset is required to move a long distance to get to the subject area, airborne or space-based platforms are preferable. Alternatively, if the information to be acquired has a signature that OPKI sources can detect, assets such as internet-based awareness tools (which are not subject to physical constraints of distance or terrain) may be appropriate.

Persistence. Persistence refers to how long an asset is able to remain in observation of the subject. How long a period the information needs to be acquired over will therefore influence the choice of asset. Whilst PKISR aircraft have the advantage of speed and can quickly move to a subject area, they can only stay airborne for a limited period of time. UAS tend to have the ability to stay airborne for longer than crewed aircraft, but even they have limits to their persistence. Conversely, a Long-Range Reconnaissance unit may be able to remain in a position to acquire HPKI on a subject for days or even weeks, depending on the composition of the unit and the nature of the environment. Similarly, the persistence of an internet-borne OPKI sensor is likely based more on the availability of analysts to monitor the subject from their base location rather than considerations regarding physical movement of units.

Environmental conditions. Factors such as the time of day and expected weather in the area where the information is to be acquired should also be considered and will influence the choice of asset. If the task involves observing the movement of an illegal armed group at night, then the chosen sensor must be capable or operating in darkness, as must the platform it is on. Certain IPKI sensors can be negatively affected by weather conditions such as rain, cloud, haze, or other atmospheric features such as smoke. Terrain must be considered as well; if the area of interest is under dense vegetation cover then basic EO sensors will struggle to see anything of value, for example. Weather can also affect platforms; aircraft will have certain windspeed limits beyond

which they cannot operate, for instance, or an HPKI unit may find their movement by vehicle or foot is degraded when heavy rain makes road conditions difficult. Even internet-based OPKI assets may find that their connectivity is degraded in certain conditions, depending on the method used to provide bandwidth to their location.

Platform configuration. Efficient use of available Mission resources must also be considered. For example, some platforms may carry multiple sensor types whereas other platforms only carry one. If a task calls for only a single sensor type, it may be inefficient to assign the multi-sensor asset to that task if it means that the other types of sensors it carries are therefore not able to be used elsewhere. In addition, not all physical platforms that carry PKISR sensors will necessarily be dedicated to PKISR as their sole function. Assets such as cargo or transport helicopters may have the ability to carry IPKI sensors of some kind, but assigning such assets to PKISR tasks is likely to therefore deny their use to move equipment for resupply activities or conduct troop movements or even medical evacuation tasks. Therefore, when Missions have assets capable of both PKISR and other functions, it is important that PKISR Plans maintains close links to both the unit and to the wider Force/Mission planning teams to coordinate tasking efficiently.

Summary checklist of basic factors for PKISR Planners to consider:

- ✓ **Subject signature:** how can it be detected? Can it be seen / heard by humans, or are other techniques needed?

- ✓ **Required information:** what do I need to provide? Images, insight into intent, evidence of activity?

- ✓ **Coordination of sensors:** what do I need to be able to detect? Colours, movement, human opinions? Can a single sensor type give me everything I need?

- ✓ **Reporting timeline:** how much time do I have? Is the answer needed immediately or in a week?

- ✓ **Threat:** what dangers exist? Will human life, equipment, or Mission reputation be at risk?

- ✓ **Distance and terrain:** where is the subject? Which assets can get to it, how quickly, and how long can they remain there?

- ✓ **Persistence:** how long must I observe the subject for? Just for an instant or for a prolonged period?

- ✓ **Environmental conditions:** what is the subject area like? Is it dark, cloudy, windy, obscured from view?

- ✓ **Platform configuration:** what can my PKISR assets do? What other tasks would this stop them doing?

5. PKISR Roles

There are some key roles which are essential for the successful management of the PKISR process. In larger Missions each role might be undertaken by a dedicated individual whereas in smaller Missions one person might need to take on more than one function. Whilst this is not ideal, smaller Missions will have fewer PKISR assets to manage, which should mean that the tasks are still achievable.

There are two aspects to the management of PKISR: Peacekeeping-Intelligence Requirements Management (IRM) and Acquisition Management (AM). The IRM aspect deals with receiving and refining IRs from inside and outside the PKI system and incorporating these into the IAP, whereas the AM aspect deals with the planning and tasking of PKISR operations. Constant coordination and communication between the two aspects are essential to ensure the most effective use of finite resources.

Additional details regarding all of the roles involved in PKISR are available within the online 'PKISR Orientation Pathway' on the Blue Line e-learning platform.

Personnel deploying into one of the PKISR roles are strongly encouraged to complete this online learning to benefit from interactive explanations of the key functions of each role.

5.1. Peacekeeping-Intelligence Requirements Management

IAP Manager

5.1.1.   Management of the IAP is fundamental to the whole IRM process. The IAP is a living document and should drive most of the acquisition activity within the Mission, and a good IAP will allow tasking of PKISR assets in the most efficient manner possible. Careful tracking of acquisition activity will demonstrate to the Mission leadership that PKISR operations are being conducted effectively.

5.1.2.   The IAP should be updated on a regular basis to ensure that the priorities remain in line with the Mission leadership's intent. This can be achieved through a quarterly meeting with the leadership to discuss their requirements. The IAP must also be updated when information gaps are closed to ensure that PKISR assets are not being misused on unnecessary tasking. For example, an EEI could relate to a specific village that is under threat of attack. If that village is destroyed by an armed group then unless there is new reporting, perhaps relating to people returning, there will be no requirement to continue to monitor the village.

5.1.3.   To ensure the most efficient management of IRs and a seamless process for handing over the IRs to the AM section for acquisition, the IAP Manager should take the IRs developed by the RFI Manager (from RFIs received from outside the PKI system) and compile all active IRs into a prioritised list. This list is then passed to PKISR Plans for development into an IAL.

5.1.4.   The IAP Manager plays an essential role in the acquisition process as the monitor of the IAP by determining whether EEIs have been answered. Each Mission manages the IAP differently; however, it is generally easier to keep a core IAP and review it periodically than to treat it as a document that is updated every time an EEI is answered. It is important for the IAP Manager to keep track of what has been answered to avoid unnecessarily repeating tasking, but it will likely be easier to achieve a picture of how overall acquisition efforts are developing if there is a periodic review of the IAP rather than a constant updating process.

RFI Manager[15]

5.1.5.   The second key role within the IRM part of the team is the RFI Manager. This role is responsible for providing the answers to PKI requirements that are received from external requestors in the form of RFIs submitted to the U2.

5.1.6.   The RFI Manager's first task is to review every RFI that is received to ensure that all information has been filled out correctly by the client. Essential elements of the RFI include the location of where the acquisition is required in as much detail as possible, ideally with a geolocation, a date and time that the information is required by, and how the information is to be disseminated. This last point is particularly important for requests to support activity that will require real-time updates; for example, an RFI requesting overwatch of a convoy must include details on how the assigned PKISR asset is to communicate with the convoy. RFIs that are submitted without dissemination information must be rejected by the RFI Manager and returned to the client to be updated.

5.1.7.   Once the RFI has been accepted by the RFI Manager, the next task should be to determine if the requested information already exists. One of the fundamental principles of PKISR is to "acquire once, use many times", meaning that instead of acquiring new information for every request, if the answer already exists then this should be sent to the client to determine if it meets their needs. It is recognised that in some Missions it will be a challenge to establish whether the information already exists but if properly managed PKI databases are in use, then these will be the place to check.

5.1.8.   If the requested information cannot be found in existing databases, the RFI Manager should consult the IAP to determine if the RFI relates to any of the current EEIs, since this will assist in the prioritisation process. If the RFI is a PKI request that does not relate directly to an EEI then the topic should be recorded. When the IAP goes through the next periodic update, this information should be reviewed to determine if the IAP properly reflects the Mission's PKI requirements. Note that RFIs which do not relate to EEIs should not be rejected for this fact alone; there will be times when the PKISR capabilities are required for operational purposes rather than PKI acquisition, such as providing overwatch of a friendly ground convoy to aid force protection. It is, however, important to track the use of PKISR assets over time to assess if the Mission is focused on using them to close PKI gaps or if the assets are being disproportionately used for non-PKI purposes.

5.1.9.   To support the prioritisation process the RFI Manager should develop the elements within the RFI into IRs. It may be that one RFI contains multiple questions, each of which should be developed into an IR that can be answered. It is the RFI Manager's job to develop these IRs and to ensure that the indicators are appropriate to the topic. Once the RFI has been broken down

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[15] An example RFI format is at Annex A to this chapter

into individual IRs, they should be passed to the IAP Manager who will develop the complete list of prioritised IRs.

5.1.10. On receipt of the IRs from the RFI Manager, the IAP Manager will assign a priority to each IR. Where the RFI relates directly to the IAP, this is straightforward. If it is operational tasking, or if the RFI does not relate to a theme or topic already on the IAP, it becomes more challenging to assign an appropriate priority to the IR derived from the RFI. Good judgement and prioritisation are essential as without these there is no way to ensure that the critical aspects of the Mission are being covered.

5.1.11. Determining the priority of operational RFIs requires a good understanding of what the Mission is focussed on. Guidance should be sought from the U2 when in doubt. For example, a request for seven continuous days of UAS coverage over a route ahead of a planned convoy when there are no reports relating to any potential for hostile activity might be assigned a low priority compared to building a pattern of life of an area ahead of a new patrol base being built. There are no right or wrong answers in prioritising operational tasking, but sound military judgement based on a clear understanding of Mission priorities and activities is essential.

5.1.12. Once all IRs are placed in priority order, the list is passed to the AM side of the PKISR team to allow them to plan the actual acquisition tasks.

5.1.13. Once the IRs relating to the RFI are successfully answered the AM team must inform the RFI Manager, who is responsible for contacting the client to confirm that the RFI has been answered. It is not necessary for the RFI Manager to disseminate the PKI product, particularly when there is a time-sensitive aspect to the RFI, but it is very important to ensure RFIs are closed to maintain an accurate oversight of the scale of unanswered daily tasking.

5.2. Acquisition Management

PKISR Plans

5.2.1. The role of the PKISR Planner is to have a short- and medium-term view on what PKI gaps or RFIs need closing and which PKISR capabilities are best placed to answer them. This includes considering geographical locations of acquisition assets as well as whether the asset is physically capable of answering the question. For example, a UAS is not well suited to determine atmospherics amongst the population in a village as it is unlikely the unit will have the necessary context of what they are looking at. In this case a HPKI team or perhaps OPKI sources might be better placed to answer the question. A short guide on basic asset-to-task matching considerations was provided in Annex B to Chapter 4.

5.2.2. Whilst the PKISR capabilities should focus on answering PKI gaps, operational planning must be taken into consideration, hence the medium-term view. For example, if a unit has a planned operation in 3 weeks' time, the PKISR planner must factor in pattern of life requirements ahead of the operation *and* overwatch during execution to ensure that appropriate PKISR capabilities are available to support for the duration, assuming the operation is considered a high enough priority.

5.2.3. When conducting routine PKISR acquisition, the best approach is to have a rolling 72-hour IAL which must be flexible enough to accommodate new time-sensitive tasking. At the 72-hour point a broad review of where the PKISR assets will be tasked is considered against what should be established. This is communicated to the units to determine feasibility. As the time

frame closes, the plan should become more mature and at the 24-hour point the plan is passed to the PKISR Ops role to execute.

5.2.4.   The PKISR Planner has three "living" IALs: one at the 72-hour point, one at the 48-hour point and one at the 24-hour point. The planner must be able to deal with impact of dynamic tasking and adjust the plans to ensure that deadlines are met. Notwithstanding dynamic tasking, the closer the IAL gets to the 24-hour point the more accurate and refined it is.

5.2.5.   The PKISR Planner's job is never complete. There are always unknowns within the Mission and when there are no RFIs or operational tasks to complete, emphasis must be on the IAP and answering the EEIs. The PKISR Planner must have a very good understanding of the IAP and routinely assign tasks to PKISR assets to close the gaps.

5.2.6.   An effective PKISR Planner adheres closely to the prioritisation that has been set, ensuring that all IRs are appropriately prioritised to develop an effective IAL. There is an art and a science to this role and the planner must not be too dogmatic about the process. A good understanding of what PKISR assets are available and the optimum acquisition asset to answer the questions will support the process.

5.2.7.   Over time the role becomes quite instinctive and the planner develops the ability to blend unplanned events such as poor weather or a changing operational plan with the planned events to minimise the impact to the IAL and maximise the acquisition opportunities.

PKISR Ops

5.2.8.   The PKISR Ops function focusses on the 24-hour period before and after the point of acquisition. The IAL is handed over to the PKISR Ops role 24 hours before execution. PKISR Ops should check the plan to make sure it is achievable and liaise with the acquisition elements to ensure they understand the tasking. At this point, priorities should also be discussed such that if a Mission is cut short for any reason, the acquisition unit understands what the key aspects of the task are so that they can focus on these.

5.2.9.   The PKISR Ops role is the key position for dynamic tasking situations. It is the PKISR Ops officer's job to determine which asset is most appropriate to support the dynamic tasking and to liaise with the respective unit to ensure that the new tasking is understood. Once the urgency of the situation has subsided, PKISR Ops should then clarify what elements of the original tasking were not completed and liaise with PKISR Plans to ensure the missed tasking is incorporated into future plans.

5.2.10. Once the acquisition period is over, it is the PKISR Ops' job to ensure that the acquisition unit disseminates the product to the requestor of the RFI, or to the U2 in the case of tasking generated internally. PKISR Ops must also track the success or otherwise of the PKISR plan for that day. This is a very important function, most notably to ensure that PKI gaps are closed so that the U2 can update the IAP to ensure only valid requirements remain on it.

5.2.11. Where commercial PKISR capabilities are used within the Mission, it is the PKISR Ops' function to determine "mission success" regarding a tasking specifically applied to the commercial provider.

5.2.12. PKISR Ops must inform the RFI Manager if the acquisition unit considers that dissemination is complete, to allow the RFI Manager to confirm with the client if they regard the

RFI as answered. Where the daily PKISR plan included tasking against the IAP, PKISR Ops must communicate with the IAP Manager, who will in turn determine with the U2 if the IR is answered.

5.2.13. The PKISR Ops task is also never completed, unless there is no PKISR acquisition planned on a given day. The PKISR Ops role can be very dynamic and the individual must be flexible to accommodate emerging, high priority requirements. For example, if reporting is received notifying the Mission of human rights violations occurring, PKISR Ops must react to this as a matter of high priority to divert acquisition assets and determine ground truth and to track the perpetrators, if possible.

5.2.14. The following graphic shows where the PKISR IRM and AM cells fit into the PKISR process.

Figure 10: PKISR Roles and the Process

5.2.15. The management of PKISR is complex and the key to success is good communication across all the roles described here and with Mission leadership and clients. If these processes are new to a Mission then they should be introduced slowly and the PKISR roles evolved within the U2 over time to allow the system to adapt. In time the PKIMB process can be introduced and

the PKISR process will become an instinctive part of the Mission's battle rhythm. The Mission should not try to adjust too quickly, instead allowing a phased approach to change.

Annex A to
Chapter Five of
PKISR Staff Handbook

EXAMPLE RFI FORM

RFI Form

1 Priority	Immediate	☐	2 Security	☐	Strictly Confidential	3 DTG of Request
	Routine	☐	Classification	☐	UN Confidential	
				☐	Unclassified	

| 4 Reference Number | | 5 Subject | |

6 Type of situation	Life threatening	☐	7 U2 Reference	
	Mission critical	☐		
	Mission essential	☐		
	Mission desirable	☐		

| 8 Request | |

| 9 When required | No later than: | Date | |
| | | Time | |

10 Format	Verbal	☐	
	Written	☐	
	Graphic	☐	

| 11 Dissemination information | Contact details, email, radio call sign, telephone | |

12 Location	Region	
	Name of village/area	
	Grid reference	

| 13 Point of contact | |

| 14 Remarks | Safety and security issues? | |

| 15 Intent to share? | With whom? | |

CHAPTER SIX

6. PKISR for the Wider Mission

6.1. PKISR for the JMAC and UNPOL

6.1.1. Whilst PKISR assets are likely to be primarily managed within the U2, it is important that the Mission develops a process to allow other MICM members, such as the JMAC and UNPOL, the ability to submit questions into the PKISR system and benefit from the information that is acquired. The practical elements of this should be conducted by the U2 using processes described within the MPKI Handbook. This should allow for a straightforward ability of MICM members to engage in the PKISR process.

6.1.2. One challenge for the U2 is the ability to incorporate the IAPs of the different units and components within the Mission into effective tasking. It will take sound judgement and communication to ensure that the IRs generated from the different IAPs are prioritised against the Force IAP to allow for a complete set of Mission priorities for acquisition. The best means to achieve this is through the PKIMB process, supported by a MICM process that is well-invested in by all elements.

6.1.3. Once all IRs are prioritised then the process for managing the IAL is the same as if it were just for the Force, and feedback is still required to determine if the IRs were answered. Likewise, MICM members may submit RFIs that are not covered within their respective IAPs and these should be treated and prioritised in the same way that any other RFIs are managed.

6.1.4. There may be times when the priorities of the Mission are such that the entire focus of the majority of PKISR assets are dedicated to the requirements of, for example, either the JMAC or UNPOL. An example of this could be a large-scale humanitarian crisis within an IDP camp that is exacerbated by aggressive armed group behaviours. Alternatively, unstable national elections could require a heightened level of UNPOL support for security purposes and PKISR is required to support this activity.

6.1.5. In either of these scenarios (or similar situations), the PKIMB can be the mechanism to manage the prioritisation of PKISR capacity to either the JMAC or UNPOL for a specific purpose. Where the periodicity of the PKIMB is not frequent enough for rapidly changing situations, ad hoc meetings can be convened to discuss the issue and reach consensus on where PKISR assets should be best used. Some Missions will convene an out-of-sequence MICM in response to major incidents, and if this occurs then it is a good forum for discussing general acquisition priorities.

6.1.6. The PKISR capabilities within the Mission should be there to support all elements and not just the Force. Developing a good process is essential to support the overall effort of delivering against the Mission's mandate.

6.2. PKISR at the Battalion level

6.2.1. The PKISR process is complex and can seem overwhelming, which can cause elements within the Mission to not engage fully in the process. This Handbook provides guidance at the Force and sector level, which should be operating in a similar way to each other but focussing on their respective IAPs. However, there is also a role at the battalion level, as a critical acquisition resource for the Mission.

6.2.2.   The concept that every UN military personnel is a potential source of acquisition is exceptionally valid in peacekeeping operations where unit patrols interact with the local population and can provide valuable information on local issues.

6.2.3.   The battalion S2 should also have an IAP covering the area of interest for units capable of conducting acquisition tasks. The S2 should be aware of where such units will be operating ahead of time to provide questions for the patrols to answer. The IAP can be used as the basis for this tasking and the S2 should liaise with the S5 and S35 in time to ensure that the tasking matches the geographic operating area.

6.2.4.   Once patrols have been completed the S2 should meet the patrol leader for a debrief on the information acquired. If possible, the patrols should be tasked to take photographs of areas of interest and if available, micro UAS can also be tasked for observation purposes. The S2 should make every effort to instigate a system, with the assistance of their local FTS, by which the footage from micro UAS used by patrols can be ingested into a Mission-wide database for maximum situational awareness and analytical value. These efforts must be conducted with sensitivity to human rights concerns. Patrols should be briefed to ensure that any information collected is used responsibly and does not violate the rights or safety of local populations.

6.2.5.   The S2 should also be prepared to receive RFIs from either the sector or Force level or from neighbouring battalions. In these cases, the S2 should incorporate the tasking into their prioritisation process and request that patrols acquire the information. The S2 does not need to generate a complex IAL process as the volume of IRs is unlikely to require that level of detail. Instead, the S2 should maintain a complete awareness of the battalion's IAP and RFIs that have been received. The S2 will likely have to perform both the IRM and AM function on behalf of the battalion.

6.2.6.   In addition to being responsible for IRM and AM at the battalion level, the S2 also has the authority to submit RFIs up the chain of command where the battalion does not have the means to answer the questions. The S2 will need to keep track of the RFIs that have been submitted and regularly communicate with the G2 and U2 to determine the status.

6.2.7.   In summary, the S2 can choose to incorporate various elements of this Handbook into their daily working practices, but early emphasis must be on providing tasking to every patrol and debriefing them on their return. The concept of units with acquisition potential providing information to the S2 must become instinctive within the battalion and once this is in place the S2 can focus on expanding the role to incorporate more aspects of the Handbook into their daily work.

CHAPTER SEVEN

7. Role of PKISR Units in the Process

7.1. Overview

7.1.1.   There is a growing requirement for PKISR to support Mission leadership in the execution of mandates in increasingly complex environments. Such needs can be filled by either commercial or military PKISR units; the former are managed through DOS (in the case of UAS, through Aviation Transport Services) and advice on the latter can be found in the PKISR UN Military Unit Manual (UNMUM).[16]

7.1.2.   Regardless of the type of unit, all acquisition capabilities are deployed to Missions to provide PKI in support of decision making to fulfil the mandate. The tasking of the units should complement their capabilities such that they are not being asked to acquire information that they are not optimised or even able to provide.

> **The use of PKISR liaison officers in the U2 helps considerably in ensuring that PKISR units are being optimally tasked. Such liaison officers can (and should) be used to support PKISR Plans in developing the IALs.**

7.1.3.   It is more efficient to provide multiple tasks to PKISR units so they can plan more flexibly and adapt whilst on task, for example if weather precludes them operating in a certain area. By having a range of tasking the unit can plan to acquire as much as possible in the most efficient manner and communicate to PKISR Ops that which was not possible for acquisition. By using the liaison officers, the PKISR Plans officer can develop a good appreciation for unit capabilities and factor this into further planning, thus reducing the amount of tasking that will not be achievable and gaining maximum benefit from the assets in question.

7.2. UAS Unit

7.2.1.   There is a wide range of UAS types that can be used to support acquisition in peacekeeping missions. The UAS Guidelines[17] give an overview of the considerations for using UAS. Class I UAS are tactical in nature and are normally used by individual units on the ground given their relatively short range and endurance, Class II UAS are larger and Missions would typically manage these capabilities at the Force level, and the largest Class III UAS should *always* be centrally managed at the Force level. It is important to note that regardless of the size and class of the UAS, the information it acquires should always be fed back into the Mission-level PKI cycle to ensure that maximum value can be extracted from it.

7.2.2.   Class I UAS will not normally have dedicated analysts and are typically used more for situational awareness purposes than for PKI, though the observation above still applies regarding the need to feed their information back into the main PKI cycle. Class II and III UAS units will typically have dedicated analysts in addition to the UAS operator/pilot, likely working at the home

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[16] PKISR UNMUM, 19 October 2022
[17] United Nations Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Capabilities, 8 February 2019

base location of the UAS in the Mission theatre and receiving the information via a datalink. These latter two classes of UAS should be capable of receiving PKISR tasking from the Force in accordance with the IAL.

7.2.3.   The UAS unit must have the ability to receive the IAL and plan the following day's tasking accordingly. The unit should be capable of determining if the tasking is achievable and be able to communicate any potential limitations back to PKISR Ops at the earliest possible opportunity. The unit should be able to prioritise the tasking effectively in accordance with the individual IR's priority, location in the theatre, and the time-sensitivity of the tasking. For example, if a lower priority IR must be acquired the following day then it should be planned ahead of higher priority IRs that are not essential for acquisition the following day. The UAS unit must work collaboratively with the AM cell (both PKISR Plans and Ops) to allow for the greatest possible flexibility of tasking.

7.2.4.   Whilst the majority of the UAS unit's tasking will be pre-planned, the unit must also be capable of reacting to dynamic tasking – unforeseen but urgent tasks that arise after the daily IAL is finalised, perhaps even while the UAS is in flight conducting the planned task. It is the function of PKISR Op to determine if the dynamic task is more important than the pre-planned one and therefore whether the UAS unit must switch immediately to the dynamic task and relocate, if required. On completion of the dynamic tasking the UAS unit must inform PKISR Ops how much of the pre-planned tasking was achieved to allow PKISR Plans to reschedule any unsuccessful acquisition. The UAS unit should not make re-tasking decisions independently as the unit will likely not be aware of the full PKISR tasking picture across the whole theatre, highlighting the importance of strong communication between the unit and PKISR Ops.

7.2.5.   The UAS unit must have access to PKI analysts (either as an inherent part of the unit's organisation or through other Mission structures) who are trained and qualified in exploiting all the sensors onboard. For the majority of UAS these will be IPKI sensors, generally EO/IR but also sometimes SAR/GMTI. The analysts must be familiar with the reporting timelines defined in paragraph 3.7 of this handbook. Furthermore, the unit must ensure that there are appropriately robust means to disseminate time sensitive information to achieve the Level 1 deadline of dissemination within 10 minutes of event capture.

7.2.6.   On completion of tasking the UAS unit must be able to disseminate the acquisition results to the client within the described timelines. In addition, the unit must inform PKISR Ops of successful and unsuccessful acquisition to allow PKISR Plans to update future IALs accordingly.

7.3.   Manned Airborne PKISR Unit

7.3.1.   The role of a manned airborne PKISR unit is very similar to the role of a UAS. The unit must still have qualified pilots, sensor operators and PKI analysts; however, for units of this type the PKI analysts can either be onboard or offboard the aircraft itself, depending on the exact asset in question and the operating procedures in place. The data may be exploited onboard or offboard via reach back, with the latter often requiring a satellite communications link due to the likely long operating ranges involved. In both cases, data exploitation can occur in near-real time; the fact that data may be exploited offboard makes it no less timely providing there is a good communications link between the ground and air-based personnel.

7.3.2.   As described in paragraph 4.1, the main difference between manned and unmanned systems is speed and endurance. The PKISR Plans team should take this into account when assigning tasking, particularly when considering dynamic tasking. Whilst a UAS might be operating closer to a developing incident that needs urgent support, a manned PKISR aircraft

may be able to reach the location faster even though it is further away. Likewise, if persistence over a particular location is required then it is likely to be more efficient to use a UAS where the pilots can swap over in the ground control station once their maximum flight hours have been reached.

7.3.3.   A manned airborne PKISR unit must still be capable of coordinating with the AM cell for tasking and disseminating the products accordingly, as described in paragraph 7.2.

7.4.   Field HPKI Team

7.4.1.   The use of HPKI operators in UN peacekeeping missions is not common. However, where they are used, the team must be capable of coordinating with the AM cell for tasking. Where HPKI is used, there should be separate U2X team to act as facilitators for tasking between the CM cell and the teams.

7.4.2.   Rather than PKISR Plans assigning specific tasking to the HPKI teams, the U2X should review the prioritised IRs and, with their knowledge of access to sources, extract what topics could be supported and feed the tasking to the HPKI teams.

7.4.3.   It can take considerable time to develop human sources with access to the kind of information that is likely to be required and therefore HPKI should not be considered a quick answer, at least not in the early days of a team arriving in the Mission. Often an HPKI unit will not be able to meet the time constraints associated with a task and therefore it is better for the U2X to generate themes based on the IRs and allow the teams to report back on what they are specifically able to acquire. A mature, confident source will be able to react to time-sensitive tasking and could respond to specific questions, but for the most part the U2X should focus on tasking for thematic reporting.

7.4.4.   The nature of HPKI and the corresponding potential threat to life for informants means this capability must remain highly sensitive. This should include separate, closed networks that the teams operate on to protect the identity of sources and control of entry to areas where source information is stored or discussed. Human rights considerations must also be factored into planning and executing HPKI activities.

7.4.5.   In terms of reporting, HPKI teams should not focus on the levels of analysis described in paragraph 3.7. The emphasis should be on providing quality products aligned to the themes tasked by U2X. Reporting should include the perceived level of access the source has and the reliability of the source. This allows the peacekeeping-intelligence analysts to apply an element of judgement on how valuable the reporting is. For example, an unreliable source with limited access is unlikely to be able to provide key information compared to a reliable source with good access.

7.4.6.   Further guidance on HPKI reporting, including source reliability metrics, can be found in the MPKI Handbook and the HPKI Guidelines referenced at Chapter 4.3 above. For all HPKI operations, UN policy and guidance must be strictly adhered to, ensuring that the activities respect international human rights standards and the mission's commitments to protect civilians.

7.5. Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP)

7.5.1. The nature of LRRP means that tasking should be assigned ahead of the unit deploying on patrol, within the constraints of their geographic operating environment. However, the unit should be contactable whilst on patrol to react to dynamic tasking, if required.

7.5.2. The LRRP liaison officers in the U2 should discuss tasking with the AM cell to develop a clear understanding of the capabilities and constraints of the unit. The LRRP is more suited to long-term surveillance and reconnaissance tasks, particularly when there are no embedded HPKI teams within the unit.

7.5.3. Wherever possible the unit should go beyond the tasking assigned by the AM cell within the U2 and in addition report on the general atmosphere in the areas they cover. For example, reporting on a market that is usually very busy but on the day of patrol it is not – this could suggest that the local population are being threatened and prevented from conducting their normal routines. The LRRP is particularly useful in supporting the development of pattern of life studies and can also work effectively in conjunction with UAS or manned airborne PKISR assets.

7.5.4. Whilst on the ground, the LRRP should be capable of providing time sensitive reporting to the U2 or G2 but non-time-sensitive reporting can wait until the unit has recovered to their home base to take advantage of more robust communications, particularly if imagery has been captured that requires analysis prior to dissemination.

7.5.5. On return to home base the LRRP should also report to PKISR Ops on the level of acquisition conducted during the patrol. PKISR Ops will then in turn communicate with the IAP Manager who will ensure that the dissemination of answered IRs is completed.

7.5.6. The LRRP liaison officer should clearly communicate with PKISR Plans how long the team will need in recovery time before deploying out on the ground again.

CHAPTER EIGHT

8. Summary

8.1.1. The intent of this Handbook is to support Missions in refining their processes and procedures to improve the way that they manage their PKISR capabilities. PKISR is a complex process that takes time to develop to allow them to operate effectively. This Handbook is intended as a guide and source of advice to Missions to support their incremental improvement of PKISR management.

8.1.2. The best way to become effective in PKISR is to follow these processes and adapt them to make them suitable for the respective Mission. There is no one single solution and Missions may choose to take only parts of the Handbook to incorporate into their daily practices, so long as they adopt the standardised terminology defined in the PKI Policy and ensure that the necessary attention is paid to maximising the available acquisition assets.

8.1.3. There is no closure to the PKISR acquisition process as it is cyclical activity. The IAP will never be complete and new RFIs will always be received to support new activity by peacekeepers.

Good communication is the single most important factor in the successful management of the PKISR process.

Communication must occur at all levels: within the U2 section filling the various roles; between the U2 and the clients; and, critically, with the Mission's leadership to ensure that priorities are very well understood.

Glossary of terms

AM	Acquisition Management
CCIR	Commanders Critical Information Requirements
CCTV	Closed-Circuit Television
CMS	Chief of Mission Support
DMS	Director of Mission Support
EEI	Essential Elements of Information
EO/IR	Electro-Optical/Infra-Red
FTS	Field Technology Services
GPKI	Geospatial Peacekeeping-Intelligence
GIS	Geospatial Information Section
GMTI	Ground Moving Target Indicator
HSI/MSI	Hyperspectral Imaging / Multispectral Imaging
HPKI	Human Peacekeeping-Intelligence
I&W	Indicators and Warnings
IAL	Information Acquisition List
IAP	Information Acquisition Plan
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IPKI	Imagery Peacekeeping-Intelligence
IR	Information or Peacekeeping-Intelligence Requirement
IRM	Information Requirements Management/Manager
JMAC	Joint Mission Analysis Centre
JOC	Joint Operations Centre
LiDAR	Light Detection and Ranging
LRRP	Long-Range Recce Patrol
LTIOV	Latest Time Information is Of Value
MICM	Mission Peacekeeping-Intelligence Coordination Mechanism
MPKI	Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence
OPKI	Open-Source Peacekeeping-Intelligence
PAI	Publicly Available Information
PIR	Priority Peacekeeping-Intelligence Requirement
PKI	Peacekeeping-Intelligence
PKIMB	Peacekeeping-Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Management Board
PKISR	Peacekeeping-Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
RFI	Request for Information
SAR	Synthetic Aperture Radar
SPKI	Signals Peacekeeping-Intelligence
SIR	Specific Peacekeeping-Intelligence Requirement
TPKI	Technical Peacekeeping-Intelligence
TCC	Troop Contributing Country
UAS	Unmanned Aircraft System
UNPOL	UN Police